University of Baltimore Law Review
Volume 37
Issue 1 Fall 2007

Article 7

2007

Comments: Beware the Dotted Line: Foreclosure
Rescue Fraud in Maryland and the Growing Effort
to Combat It
Seth Yaffo
University of Baltimore School of Law

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/ublr
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Yaffo, Seth (2007) "Comments: Beware the Dotted Line: Foreclosure Rescue Fraud in Maryland and the Growing Effort to Combat
It," University of Baltimore Law Review: Vol. 37: Iss. 1, Article 7.
Available at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/ublr/vol37/iss1/7

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in
University of Baltimore Law Review by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. For more information,
please contact snolan@ubalt.edu.

BEWARE THE DOTTED LINE: FORECLOSURE RESCUE
FRAUD IN MARYLAND AND THE GROWING EFFORT TO
COMBAT IT
I.

INTRODUCTION

If you are reading this, chances are that freedom of contract is a
principle that plays a central role in your life.
There is a very basic reason for this. You are a practitioner of the
law. To contract one must communicate, and for that one needs
language. Human language, in all its flexibility and pliability, is what
makes it possible for our contractual relationships to manifest the
same balance between determinacy and adaptability that our everchanging circumstances exhibit. This mutability is also what makes
lawyers essential to any free society. To paraphrase Reinhold
Niebuhr, interpretation of words makes advocacy possible, and its
potential for abuse makes advocacy necessary. I
Those who would abuse freedom of contract, it stands to reason,
seek out situations where an imbalance of the ability to use this
freedom can work to their advantage. 2 So it is with the growin¥
phenomenon known generally as foreclosure rescue fraud (FRF).

1.

2.
3.

Reinhold Niebuhr, a theologian by training, was one of the twentieth century's
leading political thinkers. Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., Reinhold Niebuhr's Role in
American Political Thought and Life, in REINHOLD NIEHBUHR: HIS RELIGIOUS,
SOCIAL, AND POLITICAL THOUGHT 125 (Charles W. Kegley & Robert W. Bretail eds.,
1956). In a book Niebuhr wrote against the backdrop of both communism and
fascism, id. at 137, \39, 145, he penned the line, "[mlan's capacity for justice makes
democracy possible; but man's inclination to injustice makes democracy necessary."
REINHOLD NIEBUHR, THE CHILDREN OF LiGHT AND THE CHILDREN OF DARKNESS xi
(1944).
7 JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 29.4, at 393 (rev. ed. 2002).
MARYLAND CONSUMER RIGHTS COALITION, PROTECTING HOMEOWNERSHIP: THE
CHALLENGE OF PREVENTING ABUSIVE LENDING AND FORECLOSURE PRACTICES 22
(2006) [hereinafter PROTECTING HOMEOWNERSHIP]. Foreclosure Rescue Fraud (FRF)
refers to a variety of scams that target homeowners facing foreclosure. The
foreclosure consultant convinces the homeowner that he can help the homeowner
rescue the home from foreclosure. There are several variations of FRF. For
example, the foreclosure consultant may induce the homeowner to sign confusing
paperwork that enables the scammer to drain the equity from the house or to transfer
ownership of the property and may evict the unsuspecting homeowner. ld.
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While FRF takes several different forms 4 and, like any genuinely
malignant thing, tends to mutate in response to changing conditions, 5
an example at this point should be helpful.
Consider the hypothetical situation of Linda. She is forty-five
years old and owns a two-bedroom house in a lower-middle-class
community. She has been divorced for the past seven years; her two
children are both in their early twenties, and independent. Three
years ago, Linda was diagnosed with breast cancer. A secretary by
trade and training, she had to leave her job for a part-time position
that was more compatible with the demands of her chemotherapy
schedule.
Fortunately for Linda, her cancer has gone into remission. Her
financial health, however, has taken a turn for the worse. Her
weakened physical state has made full-time employment an
unrealistic option and her current employer's health insurance
package requires hefty co-payments. Having drained the relatively
small amount of money she had saved, Linda finds that she is
essentially insolvent. Unless she chooses not to eat, her regular
income simply does not equal her monthly expenses.
As a result, she has fallen several months behind in her mortgage
payments. Feeling that she has little hope of bringing her mortgage
current anytime soon, Linda has not contacted her lender. What
would she tell them-that she cannot afford her bills? She figures
they already know that. 6 Having neither heard nor received payment
from Linda in several months, her lender decides to foreclose on her
home.
On October 10th, Linda receives a notice in the mail from her
lender informing her that her home will be auctioned off at a
foreclosure sale on October 20th.7 Needless to say, this comes as a
4.

5.
6.

7.

STEVE TRIPOLI & ELIZABETH RENUART, NAT'L CONSUMER LAW CTR., DREAMS
FORECLOSED: THE RAMPANT THEFT OF AMERICANS' HOMES THROUGH EQUITYSTRIPPING FORECLOSURE "RESCUE" SCAMS 8 (2005). See infra Part II.D. for an indepth discussion of the three basic types ofFRF.
TRIPOLI & RENUART, supra note 4, at 9.
A mistake that many homeowners in distress make is not contacting their lender as
soon as it becomes apparent that they are going to fall behind on their payments.
Reputable lenders are often willing to work with such mortgagors in fashioning
solutions to cash flow problems. For example, some lenders will extend the term of a
mortgage, thus lowering the monthly payments. Such steps are often less expensive
for the lender than the foreclosure process is. Ellen Simon, Assoc. Press, Allies
Against Foreclosure, STAR LEDGER (Newark, NJ), Apr. 6, 2007, at 23.
See infra Part II.E for a description of foreclosure procedures in Maryland. Section
7-105(a-I)(3)(i) of the Maryland Real Property Code made this procedure marginally
less onerous by requiring lenders to inform distressed borrowers within two days of

2007)

Foreclosure Rescue Fraud

115

rude shock. While she knew she was behind on her payments, Linda
had hoped that if she could scrape together at least a partial payment
over the next month or so, she might at least buy herself some time.
In any event, she had not received any notice from a court of law that
the foreclosure process had even begun. Unbt-knownst to her,
Maryland law does not mandate that a homeowner be informed by
the court of record that a foreclosure petition has been filed. 8
In fact, a few days before Linda received the bad news in the mail,
Jim, an ethically deficient entrepreneur (EDE), had already learned of
her plight. 9 He did not learn of it by accident. One way that EDEs
find potential prey is by scanning public records for homes that are in
foreclosure. Upon seeing Linda's property among those slated for the
"chopping block," Jim immediately highlighted it as a likely target.
Linda's home is in an area with a relatively stable population. This
indicates to Jim that there is a good chance Linda has built up a
significant amount of equity in her home. lo
Equity is the difference between what a homeowner owes on her
house and the house's fair market value. I I Linda bought her home
fifteen years ago with her then-husband. The home cost them
$100,000. After a down payment of $10,000, Linda and her husband
took out a loan for the remaining $90,000. Today, the home is in
Linda's name pursuant to her divorce, and only $15,000 remains to
be paid on her mortgage. The fair-market value of her house has
risen from $100,000 fifteen years ago to $190,000 today.
Therefore, although Linda is cash poor, she has $175,000 in equity
in her home. This is what Jim is going to target. Figuring that Linda
will learn of the scheduled foreclosure sale about ten days before it is
to take place,12 Jim decides to approach her in person on October
11 th, nine days before the sale is slated to occur. He picks this date
for several reasons.

8.
9.
10.
II.
12.

filing a petition for foreclosure with the circuit court in which the property at issue is
located. See MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 7-105(a-I)(3)(i) (LexisNexis 2003 &
Supp. 2006); see also infra Part III. In practice, this would alter Linda's scenario by
giving her sixteen, rather than ten days notice.
See infra Part ILE.
Present writer will, for the most part, refer to those who practice FRF as ethically
deficient entrepreneurs (EDEs).
For a more comprehensive account of the role equity plays in FRF, see infra Part
ILB.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 580 (8th ed. 2004).
REAL PROP. § 7-105(b)(2)(ii). The statute states "[t]he notice [of foreclosure sale]
shall state the time, place, and terms of the sale and shall be sent not earlier than 30
days and not later than 10 days before the date of sale." Id.
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First, he is reasonably certain Linda will have received the
foreclosure sale notice by then. This is crucial to him, because he
wants Linda to be truly desperate when he approaches her. Second,
Jim does not want to wait too long before making his initial move.
He knows that the number of EDEs operating on a regular basis in
Maryland has reached the triple digits and appears to be growing. 13
Finally, Jim likes contacting potential marks about nine days before a
scheduled foreclosure sale because the short time window works to
his advantage. 14
When Linda answers the knock on her door, she sees a man who
appears clean-cut, well-dressed in a business suit, and possessing an
empathetic manner. Jim informs her that he owns a small firm that
specializes in helping homeowners who are in precisely her situation.
He tells Linda that his friend who works for the local circuit court
helped put him in touch with her. Linda is neither stupid nor naIve,
but she is terrified at the prospect of losing her home. Simply hearing
that there is hope that this might not happen elevates her mood, and
she invites Jim into her house.
Jim initiates a discussion of Linda's general financial situation, but
what he really wants to know is how much equity she has in the
house. When he learns that Linda does in fact have quite a bit of
equity in the home, he knows she is just the sort of target he likes.
He has her fill out an application that he fully intends to throw out
once he gets back to his office. The point of this step is to delay the
process for a few days. If Jim can convince Linda that it will take,
say, four days to determine whether his firm can help her, then time
will truly be on his side when the time comes to get Linda's signature
on some documents he plans to present to her. The greater the stress
she is under, the lesser the chance she will examine or even read them
before signing.
Linda is very relieved when Jim calls to tell her that he can help
her. She agrees to meet him the following day at his office. It is now
October 16th, four days before Linda is due to lose her home. While
Jim's tone still seems to reflect concern about Linda's situation, he
exudes a greater sense of urgency than he did during their initial
meeting.
The first thing Jim tells Linda is that time is absolutely of the
essence. He is willing to help, but the firm's resources are limited. If
13.

14.

Interview with Mike Morin, Attorney, in Severn, Maryland (Nov. 27, 2006)
[hereinafter Morin Interview]. In fact, as Morin points out, the FRF scam has
become sufficiently popular in Maryland that some EDEs are actively teaching it to
others. Id.
See PROTECTING HOMEOWNERSHIP, supra note 3, at 20-21.
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Linda does not act quickly, there are two other homeowners in
similar situations who could take Linda's place. Jim explains that
Linda will sign a quitclaim deed ls on the house over to his firm, New
Beginnings, Inc. (NB). Using his firm's solid credit history, he will
obtain a loan that will enable Linda to bring her mortgage current and
thereby avoid foreclosure. While the home will "technically," as Jim
puts it, be in NB' s name, Linda will remain in the home and continue
to make monthly mortgage payments.
As Jim explains this to Linda, he flips through a large stack of
documents he has placed in front of her. Most of the documents
contain terms that are entirely superfluous and worded in a
deliberately confusing way.16 The bigger the stack, Jim knows, the
less likely it is that Linda will take on the daunting challenge of
actually reading it. Buried in the volume of verbiage which Linda
affixes her signature is a clause stating that in order to repurchase her
home from NB, she must pay the full amount remaining on her
mortgage within nine months of the date that NB acquired the deed
from her.
What Jim actually tells Linda is that she will pay NB an amount
roughly equal to what she used to pay her original mortgage lender.
This money will be applied to pay down her mortgage and will also
count toward an eventual repurchase of her home. He will also stress
to her that if she does not sign the relevant documents today, there
might not be sufficient time to secure the loan necessary to bring her
mortgage current. Feeling she has no real choice at this point, Linda
signs where she is told.
For three months Linda is able to make her monthly payments to
Jim, sometimes skipping meals in order to do so. Not surprisingly,
though, she begins to fall behind in her payments. Five months after
she signed awal her home to NB, Linda learns that Jim, acting as
NB's "agent,,,1 has begun eviction proceedings against her.18 She

15.

16.
17.

A quitclaim deed is a deed that "conveys a grantor's complete interest or claim in
certain real property but that neither warrants nor professes that the title is valid."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 11, at 446. In this situation, Linda gives up
her claim of title to her home by signing the quitclaim deed. The quitclaim deed
effectively conveys ownership of Linda's home to NB without any warranty that the
title is valid. See 26A C.J.S. Deeds § 17 (2001).
See TRIPOLI & RENUART,supra note 4, at 10.
Agency is a "fiduciary relationship created ... [where] one party (the agent) may act
on behalf of another party (the principal) and bind that other party by words or
actions." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 11, at 67. As NB's "agent" Jim is
able to bring eviction proceedings on behalf ofNB, the "principal." See id.
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appears at her county's district court on the appointed date and
attempts to inform the judge that she is not really renting the home
but, rather, is in the process of repurchasing it. The judge responds
that Maryland law limits a district court's jurisdiction to landlordtenant disputes. 19 Therefore, any issues involving ownership of
Linda's home fall outside his court's jurisdiction. 20
After Jim presents the judge with a copy of Linda's lease and the
judge quickly looks over the terms contained within it, the court sets
an eviction date. 21 Unable to redeem her "lease" before the eviction
date, Linda is evicted from her home by a group of constables from
the local sheriffs office. 22 Had she been able to make her payments
to Jim for the full nine months, he would have evicted her at that
point. Once Linda agreed to accept his "help," her fate was sealed.
Jim sells the home for $175,000. In the end, the only money he
had to spend in order to gain title to Linda's home was the $3,000 it
took to bring her mortgage current. His profit thus comes to
$172,000.
As for Linda, she remains liable for the unpaid balance on her
mortgage, which at this point is around $13,500. NB took title to her
house, but buried in the stack of documents she signed was a clause
providing that the original mortgage would still be her responsibility.
This is one form that FRF has taken in Maryland and across the
country.23 While the exact scope of the problem remains unknown,
attorneys general, enforcement officials, and lawyers representing
18.

19.
20.

21.

22.

23.

Now that NB owns Linda's home, she is no longer a homeowner, but a tenant who
can be evicted for failure to pay rent. See MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 8-401(a)
(LexisNexis 2003 & Supp. 2006). NB, now Linda's landlord, begins eviction
proceedings by filing a written complaint in the district court of the county where
Linda's home is located. Id. § 8-301(b)(l). The district court then notifies Linda that
the trial will be held five business days after the filing of NB' s complaint. Id. § 8401(b)(3).
MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 4-401(4) (LexisNexis 2006).
Id. § 4-402(b) ("Except as provided in § 4-401 ... , the District Court does not have
jurisdiction to decide the ownership of real property or of an interest in real
property.").
If Linda cannot pay the rent and late fees she owes, the court will order that
possession of the premises be given to NB within four days after the trial. MD. CODE
ANN., REAL PROP. § 8-401 (c)(3) (LexisNexis 2003 & Supp. 2006).
REAL PROP. § 8-402.1(b)(I) (LexisNexis 2003) ("If the court determines that the
tenant breached the terms of the lease ... the court shall ... issue its warrant to the
sheriff ... commanding the tenant to deliver possession to the landlord .... ").
TRIPOLI & RENUART, supra note 4, at 8-9. "The predominant foreclosure 'rescue'
scams appear to come in three varieties": phantom help, bailout, and bait-and-switch.
Id. Examples of these rescue scams have been reported in several states and the
District of Columbia. Id.
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injured parties all agree that the practice of FRF is widespread and
growing. 24 In a June 2005 report, the National Consumer Law
Center stated that nationwide "thousands upon thousands" of
vulnerable homeowners had fallen victim to FRF. 25 According to
Mike Morin, an attorney who has represented several victims of FRF,
the problem is "rife" in Maryland, particularly in the Washington,
D.C.-Baltimore corridor. 26 In fact, he states that the problem has
become so common that there are "hobby con artists" perpetrating
FRF in their spare time. 27
Advocates and government officials in Maryland echo Morin's
view. 28 It was reported that as of September 2006 there were more
than 30,000 households delinquent on their mortga:ffies.29 Of course,
not all of these people will end up in foreclosure.
However, it is
highly likely that as middle-class incomes continue to stagnate and
holders of sub-prime home loans encounter interest rate increases and
balloon payments, many of them will in fact become prime targets for
EDEs.31
The drive to put an end to FRF picked up momentum in May 2005
when Governor Ehrlich signed into law emergency legislation aimed
squarely at EDEs and their fraudulent activities. 32 The Maryland
Protection of Homeowners in Foreclosure Act (PHF A)33 is an
essential first step in eventually, one hopes, wiping out FRF in
Maryland. Before its enactment, the most skilled EDEs were able to
strip distressed homeowners of their equity in ways that arguably
were legal. For example, under the PHFA, Jim's hypothetical
swindling of Linda would be illegal, whereas before its passage he
may well have been able to achieve a similar result using means that
could have withstood judicial scrutiny. 34
24.
25.
26.

27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

See id. at 15.
!d. at 7.
Jamie Smith Hopkins, State Warns of Foreclosure 'Consultants,' BALT. SUN, Sept.
26, 2006, at 1C.
See id.
See id.
See id.
Id.
See id.; see also infra Part II.C (discussing predatory lending).
DOYLE NIEMANN, NEW PROTECTIONS FOR HOMEOWNERS IN FORECLOSURE 1 (n.d.).
MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. §§ 7-301 to -302, 7-305 to -308, 7-310 to -311,7-314 to
-315,7-318 to -321 (LexisNexis Supp.2006).
He might have done this by softening the repayment terms such that while a court
would be unlikely to find them substantively unconscionable, Linda would still have
been all but assured of eventually losing her home. See TRIPOLI & RENUART, supra
note 4, at 45. He also could have inoculated himself against claims of procedural
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An excellent first step, though, is just that-a first step. While the
PHFA makes it much more difficult for EDEs to ply their pernicious
trade without breaking the lawj there are potential loopholes in the
statute that should be closed. 5 Present writer will argue in this
Comment that violation of PHFA should be a felony rather than a
misdemeanor. 36 He will also argue that provisions in PHFA
exempting several classes of professionals, including real estate and
mortgage brokers, bankers, and attorneys, should be modified. 37 In
addition, this Comment will recommend alteration of language in the
PHFA that, as is, leaves open the possibility that lenders who,
directly or indirectly, do business with EDEs may enjoy the le~al
protections afforded to bona fide purchasers (BFP) of real property. 8
This Comment is intended to be a resource for litigators and a
primer for advocates, legislators, and government officials who seek
to prevent FRF from happening in the first place. In furtherance of
these goals, the Comment addresses the problem of FRF in Maryland
from a number of perspectives. Section II describes the confluence
of factors that has helped spawn the growing perpetration of FRF in
recent years as well as the different forms the scam tends to take.
Section III analyzes the newly created PHFA. 39 Section IV will
examine what appear to be the most significant legal issues that
litigators representing victims of FRF are likely to encounter. In
Section V, present writer will recommend a series of steps aimed
both at strengthening efforts to enforce the PHFA and, more
importantly, preventing FRF from occurring in the first place.

35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

unconscionability by cutting down on the number of documents he presented to
Linda and containing within them the required disclosures. Id. His assertions, that
someone at the court had alerted him to Linda's situation and that he needed Linda to
sign the documents immediately so that he could take out a loan in order to bring her
mortgage current were not necessary. Id. at 10. He could have gotten her to sign the
deed without resorting to them. !d. at 11.
See infra Part III.
See infra Part V.B.
See infra Part V.A.
See infra Part V.c.
See NIEMANN, supra note 32, at 3.
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THE CURRENT CONTEXT: CASH POOR BUT EQUITY
RICH HOMEOWNERS AND THE PERILS OF CREATIVE
FINANCING

A.

FRF: The Exploitation of Educational Deficiencies and
Emotional Stressors

121

People who possess the cleverness to exploit emerging
circumstances but lack the character to harness this talent for
aboveboard purposes prey upon those who, for any number of
reasons, are unable to safeguard their own interests.
The victims of FRF come in all shapes and sizes, they are
disproportionately poor and undereducated,40 which reduces the
chances that a potential victim will understand the stack of paperwork
he is given by an EDE.41 EDEs target people who are in danger of
losing their homes, often scanning public records for foreclosure
notices, because potential victims are often at an emotional as well as
an educational disadvantage. 42
The stress attendant upon the
prospect of imminent homelessness is not conducive to rigorous and
thorough analysis of proffered contractual terms. 43
Any effort to combat FRF must ultimately reckon with the fact that
the freedom to contract, without which our polity would be
unrecognizable to us, necessarily entails the risk that certain parties
will exploit superior analytical, tactical, and emotional resources at
the expense of others. 44 Moving beyond the bringing of EDEs to
penal and pecuniary justice and toward the prevention of FRF
altogether will, in certain limited ways, require us to alter the process
by which some types of real estate transactions are conducted in
Maryland. 45
However, there is arguably a difference between one investor
presciently selling a stock to a somewhat less astute party in a timely
manner, and the sharp dealing that characterizes FRF. The latter
40.
41.
42.

43.
44.
45.

See TRIPOLI & RENUART, supra note 4, at 18.
See id. at 16.
This last point should not be taken to mean that present writer believes EDEs are, by
and large, a well educated lot. The point is simply that any party who lacks formal
schooling and intellectual confidence is at least reasonably likely to sign documents
without fully understanding them and is by definition at an educational disadvantage.
TRIPOLI & RENUART, supra note 4, at 51-52.
PERILLO, supra note 2, at 393.
See infra Part V.c. The recommendations contained in Part V are designed not to
burden Maryland's real estate community with onerous restrictions, but rather to
provide a limited number of workable ideas that, if implemented, could greatly
reduce the incidence of FRF in Maryland.
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activity does little or nothing to advance economic growth in
Maryland or any other state. Present writer strongly believes that the
law can provide basic protection and recourse to vulnerable classes
without spawning anrJhing remotely resembling undue restriction
upon market freedom. 6

B.

The Centrality of Home Equity

EDEs feast on homeowners who are short on cash flow but rich in
home equity. 47
As previously explained in the Linda/Jim
hypothetical scenario, equity is the difference between the amount of
any outstanding debt that is secured by a piece of real property and
the fair-market value of that property.48 Another illustration of
equity might be helpful at this point. .
Let us say that Joe bought a home fifteen years ago. He paid
$200,000 for it, $20,000 of which constituted the down payment. To
pay the remaining $180,000, he took out a loan secured by a deed of
trust. 49 Five years ago, he decided to take out a second mortgage
(which, for our purposes, is synonymous with the term "deed of
trust") on his home in order to finance a venture he intended to
launch. 50 How did Joe's bank decide how much money it could
safely loan him? It determined the equity he had built up in his
home. First, his bank looked at the amount of money Joe still owed
on his initial loan of $180,000. He had paid off $115,000, so he had a
remaining balance of $65,000. The bank's next step was to appraise
the fair-market value of Joe's house. After ten years, the value of
Joe's home had risen to $300,000. From there the bank subtracted
the figure outstanding on Joe's original loan, $65,000, from the fairmarket value, $300,000. Therefore, Joe had $235,000 of equity in his
home when he took out his second mortgage five years ago. Had Joe
asked his bank for a loan of $100,000, his bank would almost
certainly have agreed.

46.

47.
48.

49.

50.

The three sentences immediately preceding this note are, admittedly, present writer's
own opinion. This comment is emphatically intended for intellectual consumption by
legal practitioners on both sides of the proverbial left-right dividing line.
TRIPOLI & RENUART, supra note 4, at 7-8, 41-42.
See supra Part I.
MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § I-IOI(d) (LexisNexis 2003 & Supp. 2006) ('''Deed of
trust' means only a deed of trust which secures a debt or the performance of an
obligation, and does not include a voluntary grant unrelated to security purposes.").
Mortgages and deeds of trust are loans secured by real property. The difference
between them mainly concerns the procedural manner in which each is redeemed in
the event of foreclosure. ALEXANDER GORDON, IV, GORDON ON MARYLAND
FORECLOSURES § 3.2, at 28-29 (4th ed. 2004).
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To further illustrate the significance of equity, let us look at what
might have happened if Joe's venture had failed and he had become
personally insolvent, thus triggering foreclosure on his home.
Suppose that the foreclosure happened three years after Joe took out
his second mortgage for $100,000. At this point, Joe had a remaining
balance of $32,000 on the original loan with which he bought his
house, and a balance of $70,000 on the second loan he needed to
begin his ill-fated business.
Meanwhile, in the three years since his bank appraised his home's
fair-market value at $300,000, a booming local real estate market has
inflated this figure to $340,000. Thus, we have a piece of real
property valued at $340,000 about to be liquidated at a foreclosure
sale in order to redeem the total balance of the two loans, which
comes to $102,000. With $238,000 of equity in Joe's soon-to-be
former house, his two lenders are in an excellent position. They are
going to get their money back without a sweat, and the equity Joe had
accumulated in his home is the primary reason. 51

C.

Predatory Lending-A Boon to the Scammers

There are a number of reasons why a person may become
temporarily or even permanently cash-poor despite having amassed
significant home equity. Health crises, layoffs, and retirement are
among the more common ones. 52 More broadly, the stagnation of
middle- and lower-middle-class incomes over the past twenty years,
often termed the "middle class squeeze,,,53 has helped to create fertile
ground for EDEs.54 In many parts of the country, including
Maryland, the curious confluence of stagnating incomes and rising
real estate values has produced a spike in just the sort of equity-rich,
yet cash-deficient households, that foreclosure scam artists target. 55
However, no account of distressed homeownership in America
today would be adequate without a description of the role subprime
51.
52.

53.

54.
55.

TRIPOLI & RENUART, supra note 4, at 42.
Id. at 7; see also Florence Wagman Roisman, National Ingratitude: The Egregious
Deficiencies of the United States' Housing Programs for Veterans and the "Public
Scandal" of Veterans' Homelessness, 38 IND. L. REv. 103, 141 (2005)
("[U]nemployment, death, illness, and spousal abandonment are major reasons why
homeowners lose their homes through default and foreclosure.").
TRIPOLI & RENUART, supra note 4, at 5; see also Elizabeth Warren, The Middle Class
on the Precipice, HARV. MAG. Jan./Feb. 2006, at 28, available at
http://www.harvardmagazine.com/on-line/010682.htm (providing a broad discussion
of the economic pressures on the middle class).
TRIPOLI & RENUART, supra note 4, at 3.
Id. at 7-8.
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lending plagrs in placing vulnerable households at risk of
foreclosure. 5 A subprime loan (SPL) is one that carries a higher
interest rate and often higher fees than a traditional prime loan. 57
SPLs are typically extended to borrowers whose income and credit
status would have rendered them ineligible for prime rate credit,
although it should be noted that some subprime lenders tar~et people
who mistakenly believe they are ineligible for prime loans.
In 1993, SPLs accounted for 1% of new loan originations. 59 By
2004, this figure had risen to over 20%.60 It is estimated that
between 10% and 20% of SPLs are used for home purchases. 61 The
other 80% to 90% are typically backed by the borrower's existin~
home equity and are generally used for consumer credit purposes.
The majority of SPLs are not used for home purchases because the
increased risk of default they entail requires, from the lender's
standpoint, that a borrower already have earned a significant amount
of home equity as security for the loan. 63 A typical first-time
homebuyer, especially one who is unable to obtain a prime loan, is
unlikely to be in a position to make a large down payment on a new
home and will not accrue much equity for at least a few years. 64
From an EDE's perspective, SPLs are attractive because they carry
a higher risk of eventual default than prime loans. 65 Whether or not a
potential victim bought her house using an SPL, uncured delinquency
equates to eventual foreclosure because most of these loans are
secured by the borrower's home. 66 That risk of foreclosure is

56.
57.

58.

59.
60.
61.

62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

Id. at 7.
Lauren E. Willis, Decisionmaking and the Limits of Disclosure: The Problem of
Predatory Lending: Price, 65 MD. L. REv. 707, 723 (2006) ("Conversely, sub-prime
loans generally rely more heavily on the equity in the home and up-front fees, in
addition to higher interest rates, to cover higher origination, servicing, and default
risk costs than do prime loans.").
Id. at 726-27. According to Willis, a significant number of minority, lower-middleincome borrowers believe they would not qualifY for prime market loans when in fact
they possess excellent credit and need not resort to SPLs. Id. at 771, 773-74, 776.
Willis notes that some subprime creditors are all too willing to cater to the
misperceptions of these borrowers. Id. at 730.
Id. at 722.
Id.
Id. at 723.
Jd.
Id.
Id.
See id.
!d.
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heightened by the practices of many SPL lenders. 67 Dramatic
advances in data processing and computer networking that took hold
during the 1990s have made it possible for lenders to tailor loans on
an individual basis. 68
In theory, a greater variety of financing options should go hand in
hand with increased comJ'etition for borrower business and thus
expand consumer choice. 6 The reality, however, is that many SPL
lenders pack their loans with excessive up-front charges and interest
rates disproportionate to the level of risk entailed. 7o A major reason
why market competition among lenders does not prevent these types
of practices is that the customization made possible by present-day
processing technologr has yielded a dauntingly complex array of
loans and loan terms. I Therefore, people who are in the market for
SPLs do not typically have the option of price shopping for credit in a
manner that is even remotely straightforward and comprehensible. 72
Further, the nature of the SPL lending process undercuts the
consumer's opportunity to price-shop. Because purveyors of SPLs
can craft loans on a per-customer basis, the only way for potential
borrowers to com-Nare terms would be to actually apply with several
different lenders. Subprime borrowers are unlikely to do this for a
People with subpar credit, or whose
number of reasons. 74
experiences have led them to believe their credit is poor, often lack
the funds necessary to pay application fees to a multiplicity of
lenders. 75 In addition, consumers of SPLs are disproportionate~
undereducated in relation to those who borrow from prime lenders. 6
Even if most could afford to submit applications to three or four or
even five different lenders, the complexity of the terms contained in
67.

68.

69.
70.
71.
72.

73.
74.
75.
76.

See generally id. at 724--28. Industry practices such as complicated price structuring,
exaggerated original costs, and a lack of transparency impact loan selection and
ability to repay. Id.
Id. at 719, 724. Willis suggests that the dramatic increase in SPLs from 1993 to 2004
occurred in significant part because of lenders' increased ability to fashion loans to
match individual financial profiles. ld. at 719-20. This practice is commonly
referred to as "price nichification." ld. at 724.
See id. at 726.
!d. at 725. Lenders may include junk fees such as underwriting or escrow analysis
fees or inflate the costs of credit insurance. !d.
!d. at 724--27. Price nichification makes advertising and price-shopping incredibly
difficult. ld.
Id. at 727-28.
!d.

ld. at 762. The specific issues are time and money.
ld. at 763-64. See generally TRIPOLI & RENUART, supra note 4, at 7.
Willis, supra note 57, at 763-64.
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any offer would severely limit the odds of the applicants using these
competing offers to arrive at a decision in line with their economic
self-interest. 77
Finally, the process of applying for home-based credit can be
emotionally taxing for people who are at risk of being denied. 78
Some writers have likened it to a "financial strip search.,,79 All of
these factors work to the disadvantage of subprime borrowers by
effectively curtailing competitive ~ressure on lenders to offer
favorable, or at least fair, terms. 8
Abuses of the advantages
bestowed upon lenders by these market imperfections have become
commonplace to the point where "predatory lending" is a household
term. 81
Many SPLs contain high risk, unduly costly terms that might not be
clear to the homeowners who agree to them until it is too late. 82 For
example, it is not uncommon for SPLs to contain a sharp increase in
the monthly amount due as a loan matures. 83 Sometimes called
balloon payments, these hikes often leave homeowners with little
choice but to refinance at terms that are still more unfavorable. 84
Other SPLs, particularly those with adjustable interest rates, begin
with relatively low monthly payments that rise over time to levels
that mayor may not be within the borrower's reach.85 The common
thread among the different varieties of predatory loans is that they put

77.

78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

83.
84.
85.

!d. at 727. For example, the total cost of a loan is often far from clear to many subprime borrowers. Many of these borrowers decide whether to take on a home-equity
loan based primarily upon the monthly amount due. !d. at 788. The required
monthly payment, however, by itself, tells a prospective borrower very little about
the total cost of the loan. !d. In order to calculate the latter, one would have to first
figure out the principal, often inflated by up-front fees, then extrapolate several years
into the future based on the percentage rate, with the added uncertainty presented by
adjustable rates often a part of the mix. Id. at 724-25, 727. Acceleration clauses and
prepayment penalties would further complicate any attempt to estimate the total cost
of many subprime loans. Id. at 726. Present writer asserts that a mathematical
morass that would be daunting to a typical Ph.D. candidate in the humanities is likely
to prove beyond the grasp of many sub-prime consumers.
Id. at 772.
Id. at 775.
Id. at 723-30.
!d. at 736, 740.
See generally id. at 766. (Most subprime borrowers "will take the first loan offer that
comes in below their maximum monthly payment limit. ... [T]hey assess feasibility
by looking at the near-term monthly payments only.").
See generally id. at 724-25 (noting that subprime adjustable rate mortgages can
increase each year).
See id. at 738.
See generally id. at 778.
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homeowners at an increased risk of foreclosure. 86 As such, the recent
proliferation of SPLs has been a boon for EDEs.87

D.

The Basic Types of FRF

There are three primary ways in which distressed homeowners may
be swindled out of all or part of the equity they have earned over the
years.88 EDEs profit from (1) offering illusory assistance, sometimes
called "phantom help,,;89 (2) acquiring title to homes in foreclosure
by promisin homeowners the opportunity eventually to reacquire
ownership; 9 and (3) gaining title by fraudulent means such as
leading their clients to believe they are signing loan documents or,
even in some cases, for~ing homeowners' signatures. 91
In the first type of scam, an EDE will approach a homeowner who
has just received notice that her house has been scheduled for a
foreclosure sale. 92 The EDE will offer to negotiate with her lender,
as long as she pays a significant up-front fee, sometimes in the
thousands of dollars. 93 While the scam artist might make a phone
call or two on the homeowner's behalf, any actual work performed is
at best a token effort. 94 A particularly ironic aspect of this form of
FRF is that the victim often loses her home when earlier, cost-free
intervention by a reRutable non-profit organization might have saved
it from foreclosure. 5
The second type of FRF is likely, in light of the PHFA's various
disclosure requirements,96 to become the preferred choice of
Maryland's most sophisticated EDEs, if it is not already.97 The
hypothetical scenario described in the introduction is an example of

cr

86.

87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

95.
96.
97.

Jd. at 736, 740.
See, e.g., TRIPOLI & RENUART, si.pra note 4, at 7.
See id. at 8.
ld.
ld.
ld.at8-9.
ld. at 9.
See generally id. at 8.
See id. at 8, 29 ("[P]eople [are charged] an exorbitant amount of money for a couple
of futile phone calls to their mortgage company or referral to a bankruptcy attorneyall phone calls the clients could have made themselves.").
See generally id. at 8.
See supra Part III.
Morin Interview, supra note 13; see also Interview with Phillip Robinson, Executive
Director, Civil Justice Network, in Baltimore, Maryland (Oct. 20, 2006) [hereinafter
Robinson Interview]. Morin and Robinson are FRF attorneys in Maryland. Morin
Interview, supra note 13.
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this type of scam, sometimes referred to as a faulty "bailout.,,98 The
EDE approaches a homeowner facing imminent foreclosure and
offers to bring the mortgage current in exchange for title to the
property. 99 The victim is led to believe that while remaining in the
home as a renter, he will eventually be able to regain legal ownership
of his house. 100 In fact, the terms by which any reconveyance to the
homeowner may occur are normally so restrictive or onerous that the
EDE almost always ends up retaining title to the pro~erty and, with it,
the equity the homeowner spent years accumulating. 01
An important way in which the "bailout" form of FRF has evolved
in Maryland involves the use of third-party "investors." \02 An EDE
will approach a homeowner in foreclosure and propose to assume
title to the property in exchange for immediate help in bringing the
delinquent loan current, with an option for the homeowner ultimately
to reacquire title. \03 In these respects, it is similar to the scam
described immediately above. However, instead of acquiring the
prope~ in his own name, the EDE will enlist the assistance of a third
party. I 4 The victim will then be directed to sign over a deed to this
third party, whom the EDE will typically refer to as an "investor." \05
The so-called investor does not actually invest anythin .106 In fact,
he is sometimes paid as much as $15,000 by the EDE. R
07 In return,
the EDE skims off the equity without taking on any liability in his
own name or that of his firm. 108 The quickest way to do this is to
take out a new mortgage secured by the equity in the property at
issue. 109 This new loan will actually be in the third party's name,
although the implications of this might not always be clear to the
third party. I \0 If the victim, for example, has accrued $90,000 in

98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

107.
108.
109.
110.

See supra Part I; see also TRIPOLI & RENUART, supra note 4, at 8.
Morin Interview, supra note 13; see also Robinson Interview, supra note 97.
TRIPOLI & RENUART, supra note 4, at 8.
/d.
Morin Interview, supra note 13; Robinson Interview, supra note 97.
Morin Interview, supra note 13; Robinson Interview, supra note 97.
Morin Interview, supra note 13; Robinson Interview, supra note 97.
Morin Interview, supra note 13; Robinson Interview, supra note 97.
Morin Interview, supra note 13. Morin related to present writer an anecdote in which
one of these third parties was asked during a court proceeding how much he had
"invested" in the property at issue. To the judge's bemusement, the "investor,"
without any apparent sense of irony, gave a response along the lines of "I don't pay
anything. They pay me. I'm an investor." /d.
/d.; see also Robinson Interview, supra note 97.
Morin Interview, supra note 13; Robinson Interview, supra note 97.
Morin Interview, supra note 13.
Id.
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equity, the EDE might take out a new loan for $70,000 in the third
party's name.
On the one hand, because the EDE is not liable for this loan and
has no legal obligation to repay it, he has already profited
handsomely without having to concern himself with evicting the
homeowner and reselling the property. I II On the other hand, if the
EDE anticipates a significant rise in the property's value over the
next year or so, he could use the proceeds from the new loan to keep
both it and the victim's original loan current. When the property's
market value has risen sufficiently to render it profitable for the EDE
to do so, he could then evict the homeowner, sell the house to a BFP,
and, if he wants to avoid litigation, payoff both the homeowner's
mortgage and the third-party "investor's" loan. 112 Once again, the
profitability of such a maneuver would depend upon how much the
property had appreciated in value since the original contract between
the EDE and the victim. However, putting the loan in the third
party's name and not his own gives the EDE the option of either
making off with the proceeds of this loan (the one in the third party's
name) or executing the gambit just described. II3
The third form of FRF differs from the second in that the
homeowner does not realize he is transferring legal title to his
property to the EDE.114 Given the level of stress a cash-poor
Ill.

112.

113.

114.

[d. Of course, to say that the EOE has no legal obligation to repay the loan is merely
to say that the loan is the third party's responsibility. This does not mean that what
the EOE has done here is legal. Certainly, on the face of it, it appears that the EOE
has committed a common law fraud against the third party. See Sass v. Andrew, 152
Md. App. 406, 492, 832 A.2d 246, 260 (2003) (articulating five elements of common
law fraud). Given both the third party's lack of clean hands in these sorts of
situations and the likelihood that the EDE would not choose a third party who
appeared astute to begin with, it seems reasonable that the risk of facing litigation
initiated by the third party is a risk the more incorrigible EOEs would be willing to
take. Morin Interview, supra note 13.
See MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 8-401(a)-(b) (LexisNexis 2003 & Supp. 2006);
see also TRIPOLI & RENUART, supra note 4, at 19, 26 (stating that the former
homeowner is now acting as a tenant and the EOE is the landlord); see also Morin
Interview, supra note 13.
The scenario just described is in fact a product of present writer's own thinking. It
does not mirror any particular account in the sources cited herein nor is it directly
derived from any of the cases Morin or Robinson are currently litigating. The
scenario, however, is useful in illustrating the inherent versatility of the FRF scam.
As Parts III-V will demonstrate, in order to actually put an end to FRF, as opposed to
simply adding to the ways in which it is illegal, one must endeavor to think like an
EOE and thus anticipate possible variations of FRF before they have a chance to
occur.
TRIPOLI & RENUART, supra note 4, at 8-9.
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homeowner facing foreclosure is likely experiencing, it is not
surprising that EDEs have been able to trick their victims into signing
over title to their homes. liS A familiar tactic is to lead the
homeowner to believe that what she is signing is actually an
agreement to refinance her original mortgage. I 16 Another method
employed by EDEs is what might be called the "cut and paste"
approach. 117 Here, the scammer has his victim sign documents that
contain blank spaces and later inserts language purporting to convey
title to the EDE.1l8 In fact, it appears that at least one of Maryland's
EDEs has actually engaged in the forgery of a victim's signature. I 19
While there is no way of knowing with exactitude the proportional
significance of each type of FRF in Maryland, the opinion of two
Maryland attorneys in the field is that the second and third kinds of
FRF described represent the most serious threat to vulnerable
homeowners. 120 The attorneys most active in litigating FRF have
focused their energies on cases involving transfers of title. 121 This is
not surprising, because the amounts of money involved are generally
greatest when transfer of title is involved. 122 The analysis and
suggested steps to follow, therefore, deal primarily with forms of
FRF that include transfer of legal title to the victim's home.
E.

Maryland's Summary Foreclosure Process

The EDE's job is made easier by Maryland foreclosure law. A
mortgagee (lender) must provide notice to the mortgagor
(homeowner) no sooner than thirty days and no later than ten days
before the scheduled date of the foreclosure sale. 123 Although the
statute requires that this notice be sent both by first-class mail and
certified mail (return receipt requested), it does not require that any
judicial notice be served upon the mortgagor pursuant to the
foreclosure sale. 124

117.

Morin Interview, supra note 13.
Nathaniel C. Nichols, Home Alone: Home Mortgage Foreclosure Rescue Scams and
the Theft of Equity, II 1. AFFORDABLE Hous .. & CMTY. DEV. L. 280, 282 (2002).
Morin Interview, supra note 13.

118.
119.

Id.
Id.

120.
121.
122.

Morin Interview, supra note 13; Robinson Interview, supra note 97.
Robinson Interview, supra note 97.
This is so because with "phantom help" a victim might lose a few thousand dollars
but is not stripped of most or all of the equity she has earned in her home, as is the
case when the EDE's take title to the properties involved. TRIPOLI & RENUART,
supra note 4, at 8-9.
MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 7-105(b)(2)(ii) (LexisNexis 2003 & Supp. 2006).
See id. § 7-105(b)(l)(ii); see GORDON, supra note 50, at 59.

liS.
116.

123.
124.
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The great majority of home loans in Maryland contain either an
assent to a decree clause or a power of sale clause. 125 The two
clauses differ mainly in the degree to which each frovides for judicial
involvement in the foreclosure sale process. 12
Under an assent
decree, the circuit court of the county in which the property at issue is
located empowers the lender, or a trustee of the lender, to carry out a
foreclosure sale upon adequate documentation of the loan's
delinquency. 127 Power of sale foreclosures, on the other hand, are
more directly managed by the court. 128 For a homeowner without the
funds to redeem her mortgage before the date of sale, it is a
distinction without a difference. Neither type of foreclosure sale
requires service of process upon the homeowner. 129
The procedural options for someone facing foreclosure are quite
limited. In order to petition the court for an injunction to stop the
sale, the petitioner must deposit with the court the full amount
required to redeem the delinquent mortgage. 130 The grounds upon
which an injunction may be granted are limited,131 but for
homeowners in this situation the point is moot. 132 If this homeowner
had the funds to deposit with the court, she would probably not be the
customary target of EDEs. This is all the more true given that by the
time a foreclosure sale has been scheduled, attorney's fees and other
costs (such as auctioneer's fees) have typicall¥ been added to the
amount required to bring the mortgage current. 13
The only other procedural avenue available to Maryland
homeowners who face foreclosure is to file objections to the sale
after it has occurred or objections to the accounting process by which
the past due amount was ca1culated. 134 Both options require highly
technical arguments, and neither provides a distressed homeowner

125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.

GORDoN,supra note 50, at 17-18.
!d. at 20.
Id. at 18,244.
!d. at 301.
!d. at 59.
See PROTECTING HOMEOWNERSHIP, supra note 3, at 20-21.
See GORDON, supra note 50, at 23-24.
See id. at 22.
PROTECTING HOMEOWNERSHIP,supra note 3, at 120.
GORDON, supra note 50, at 23-24. In a sharply worded opinion that bordered on the
dismissive, the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland, in Billingsley v. Lawson, 43
Md. App. 713, 725, 406 A.2d 946, 954 (1979), upheld the constitutionality of
Maryland's foreclosure laws against a challenge on both federal and state due process
grounds.

132

Baltimore Law Review

[Vol. 37

with the thing she really needs-additional time. 135 The state
legislature has addressed this in a small way by requiring a person
authorized to make a foreclosure sale to notify the mortgagor within
two days of filing with the court. 136 In practice, this means that a
homeowner facing foreclosure will receive notice fifteen to twenty
days before the date of sale, rather than ten days. 137 It does not seem
likely that this extra time will hinder the EDEs; however, because
fifteen to twenty days is still a sufficient period to exploit a
homeowner's emotional distress.
However, the PHFA does make life harder, or at least more
complicated, for the EDEs in a number of ways. The following
analysis of the PHFA illustrates this point.
Ill. THE MARYLAND PROTECTION OF HOMEOWNERS IN
FORECLOSURE ACT
On May 26, 2005, former Maryland Governor Robert Ehrlich, Jr.
signed the Protection of Homeowners in Foreclosure Act: 138 an
"emergency" statute aimed squarely at the perpetrators of FRF.139
Partially based on a similar statute in Minnesota,140 the PHFA is, on
balance, a good law in several respects. 141 It provides a direct way
for liti.,gators to prove the illegality of the more sophisticated forms of
FRF.I While the Maryland Consumer Protection Act l43 (CPA) and
common-law doctrines including fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, and
unconscionability provide grounds for arguing the illegality of FRF
practices, the PHFA makes it much easier to contend with this in a
manner that will prevail in court. 144
13S.
136.
137.
138.

139.
140.

141.

142.

143.
144.

PROTECTING HOMEOWNERSHIP, supra note 3, at 20.
MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. §§ 7-IOS(a-I)(l) to (a-I)(3)(i) (LexisNexis 2003 &
Supp. 2006).
GORDON, supra note SO, at 23.
MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. §§ 7-301 to -321 (LexisNexis Supp. 2006) (subtitled
"Protection of Homeowners in Foreclosure."); see also TRIPOLI & RENUART, supra
note 4, at 24.
REAL PROP. §§ 7-301 to -321.
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 32SN.OI(b)(9) (West 2004 & Supp. 2007). While Maryland
adoptcd the same basic premise as Minnesota, a few differences are notable. The
statutes clearly differ on whom they regulate, and exempt, and the amount of
damages that can be recovered. See also TRIPOLI & RENUART, supra note 4, at 24.
Interview with Alexander Gordon, IV, Author, in Baltimore, Maryland (Nov. 29,
2006) [hereinafter Gordon Interview].
See generally TRIPOLI & RENUART, supra note 4, at 64 (including provisions that
cover all three types of foreclosure specialists: foreclosure consultants, foreclosure or
equity property purchasers, and foreclosure or equity surplus purchasers).
MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW §§ 13-101 to -501 (LexisNexis 2005).
TRIPOLI & RENUART, supra note 4, at 45-46.
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The PHF A defines "foreclosure consultant" in broad terms. Under
the statute's language, anyone who in any way represents to a person
that he can delay or prevent foreclosure of that person's home
qualifies as a foreclosure consultant and thereby is covered under the
PHF A. 145 The relevant language is in the singular tense ("contacts a
homeowner"); thus it appears that an EDE need only have had
contact with a single victim in order to fall under the PHFA's
authority.146 Assistance in securing a loan or other source of funds is
listed among the activities that designate a party as a foreclosure
consultant under PHF A, as is any assistance in preventing or limitin,R
damage to the credit rating of a homeowner facing foreclosure. I
The PHFA also covers oral, written, in-person, and electronic means
of representation as well as contacts made through
telecommunications. 148 The PHF A is comprehensive in defining a
foreclosure consultant. There seems to be no way that an EDE could
propose to render any form of assistance of interest to a homeowner
facing foreclosure that would not subject that EDE to the PHFA's
. 149
authonty.
The PHF A however, does exempt several classes of
professionals. 150 The statute does not apply to attorneys or anyone
whose "normal business activities" fall under the authority of either
Maryland or United States law "regulating banks, trust companies,
savings and loan associations, credit unions, or insurance
companies." 151 Similarly, the PHF A does not apply to title insurers
and title insurance producers authorized or licensed to conduct
business in Maryland, and mortgage brokers and lenders whose
authorit~ derives from Title 11, Subtitle 5 of the Financial Institutions
Article. 52 The statute also exempts real estate brokers, associate real
estate brokers, and real estate salespeople licensed under Title 17 of
the Business Occupations and Professions Article. 153 Additionally,
the PHFA excludes any non-profit organization that deals exclusively
with homeowners in loan default or facing foreclosure, so long as the
organization does not have any direct, indirect, or privity relationship

145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
ISO.
lSI.
152.
153.

MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP.

§ 7-301(b)(l)(i) (LexisNexis Supp. 2006).
See id. § 7-301(b)(l).
See id. §§ 7-301(b)(l)(vi)-(vii).
See id. § 7-301(b)(l).
See generally id. § 7-301(b).
See id. § 7-302(a).
!d. §§ 7-302(a)(1), (a)(3)(i).
!d. §§ 7-302(a)(5)-(a)(7).
!d. § 7-302(a)(8).
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with for-profit lenders or foreclosure purchasers. 154 Finally, the
PHF A exempts any creditors of the homeowner, so long as the
homeowner's obligation to the creditor did not arise from a
foreclosure reconveyance. 155
Language in the PHFA provides, however, that even parties who
fall into an exempted class lose this exemption if they engage in
activities "intended to transfer title to a residence in foreclosure
directly or indirectly to that individual, or an agent or affiliate of that
individual.,,156 The statute does not define affiliate for the purposes
of determining whether an otherwise exempted party shall be subject
to its coverage. In Part V, this Comment will argue that the lack of a
clear and inclusive definition of affiliate opens a potential loophole
that should be closed. 157
The PHFA also defines "foreclosure consulting contract" and
"foreclosure consulting service.,,158 It defines the former as an oral,
written, or equitable agreement by which a foreclosure consultant
agrees to grovide any foreclosure consulting service to a
homeowner. 59 The scope of the former defmition, therefore,
depends upon the substance of the latter. In broad, exhaustive terms,
the PHF A states that the term "foreclosure consulting service"
includes any efforts to contact or negotiate with creditors on the
homeowner's behalf as well as any efforts to prevent or delay
foreclosure. 160
The PHFA's definition of "foreclosure consulting service" also
encompasses any efforts to effect an arrangement by which a
homeowner will transfer title to another party as an alternative to
foreclosure; remain in the home as a renter, tenant, or lessee; or
convey title with an option to reacquire ownership of the home. 161
Given the PHFA's language, only a willfully restrictive reading of
the statute would fail to include any plausible form of FRF from its
coverage. The addition, however, of language expressly providing
that the PHFA should be construed liberally for coverage and
enforcement purposes would be a welcome addition.

154.
ISS.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.

/d. § 7-302(a)(9).
See id. §§ 7-302(a)(4), 7-105(b).
Id. § 7-302(b).
See infra Part V.A.
REAL PROP. §§ 7-301(c)--(d).
Id. § 7-301(c).
See generally id. § 7-301(d).
See id. §§ 7-301(d)(7)--(d)(I0).
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The PHFA gives homeowners the right to "[ r]escind a foreclosure
consulting contract at any time." 162 In addition, it provides that a
homeowner may "[r]escind a foreclosure reconveyance at any time
before midnight of the [third] business day after any conveyance or
transfer in an~ manner of legal or equitable title to a residence in
foreclosure." 1 3 The statute defines rescission in appropriately
inclusive terms, stating that it may occur by writing, facsimile, or
electronic mail, provided it is sent to an address identified either in
the contract or in any other materials that the foreclosure consultant
provided to the homeowner. 164 A rescission is effective, regardless
of whether its form mirrors that of the contract, as long as it makes
clear the homeowner's intent to rescind either the contract or the
reconveyance. 165 Finally, the PHFA expressly states that "[t]he riftht
to rescind may not be conditioned on the repayment of any funds." 66
While the PHF A's rescission provisions appear to be properly
tailored to the protection of vulnerable homeowners, the provisions
might not go far enough. Extending the three-day period for
rescission of foreclosure reconveyances to ten days, for instance,
would provide potential FRF victims with added time to digest the
terms of any agreement which they have signed. It is worth restating
here that time constraints,167 limitations set by the courts,168 and
psychological pressures from EDEs 169 all lessen the likelihood of a
homeowner actually understanding and reflecting upon the terms of
an agreement to convey title in her home to another party. While the
three-day rescission window affords some protection, it would be
better for the legislature to err on the side of caution and provide
more time. If a ten-day period is too long for some Maryland
lawmakers, perhaps they could craft a compromise in the five-toseven day range.
The PHF A also attempts to render the terms of foreclosure
consulting contracts and reconveyances a bit more clear to potential
162.
163.

164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.

ld. § 7-305(a)(I).
[d. § 7-305(a)(2). The Maryland Protection of Homeowners in Foreclosure Act
("PHF A") defines "foreclosure reconveyance" as a transaction in which a
homeowner facing foreclosure transfers title of the property to another party with the
understanding that the homeowner will reacquire title to the home following the
completion of the foreclosure proceeding. See id. §§ 7-301(1)(1)-(2).
See id. § 7-305(b).
[d. § 7-305(d).
!d. § 7-305(1).
See supra notes 123-24 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 125-37 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 40-43 and accompanying text.
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victIms. It requires that any contract be printed in at least 12 point
type and written in the language typically spoken by the
homeowner. 170 Perhaps more significantly, the PHFA mandates that
foreclosure consulting contracts specify the exact nature of the
services to be provided, including any reconveyances. 171 Finally, the
contract must "[fJully disclose ... the total amount and tenns of any
compensation" that the foreclosure consultant., "or anyone working in
association with the consultant" will receive. 1 2
The PHFA does not attempt to define the terms exact nature or in
association. 173 It is, therefore, not clear if the latter term is
synonymous with the above-discussed term affiliate. 174 Regardless,
nature and association tend to be concepts of degree rather than
precision,175 and may lend themselves more readily to judicial
interpretation than to any attempt at statutory definition. 176 As noted
above, present writer recommended that the Maryland legislature add
language to the PHFA expressly prescribing that its provisions be
liberally interpreted. 177 This recommendation bears repeating here.
The legislature might also consider including a statement such as:
"Any potentially ambiguous terms in the PHFA, such as 'exact
nature,' 'affiliate,' or 'in association,' are to be construed in a manner
consistent with the PHFA's overarching goal of protecting vulnerable
homeowners facing foreclosure."
In keeping with the aforesaid attempt to hold foreclosure
consultants to a certain standard of contractual clarity, the PHFA
requires that all foreclosure consulting contracts include, in at least
15-point type, notice of the homeowner's right to rescind. 178 The
statute also states that all foreclosure consulting contracts must
include, in at least 14-point boldface type, notice of the homeowner's
right to rescind a foreclosure reconveyance as well as an admonition

170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.

176.

177.
178.

REAL PROP. § 7-306(a)(2).
Id. § 7-306(a)(3).
Id.

See id. §§ 7-301, 7-306.
See supra notes 156-57 and accompanying text.
Cj John Harllee. The Protection of the Unpublished Application Protocol Interface
Under Copyright Law, 4 VA. J.L. & TECH. 6, ~ 34 (1999), http://www.vjolt.netJ
voI4/issue/v4i2a6-harllee.html (stating that "the meaning of 'nature' is statutorily
quite ambiguous"); Jenny Dionne Dennis, The California Legislature Decided That
Unincorporated Businesses are People Too, 38 MCGEORGE L. REv. 247, 253 (2007)
(characterizing "association" as an ambiguous term open to judicial interpretation).
See, e.g., Harllee. supra note 175, at ~ 34; see also Dennis. supra note 175, at 253.
See supra notes 161-62 and accompanying text.
REAL PROP. § 7-306(c)(2)(iii).
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that the homeowner should "contact an attorney before signing." 179
While these provisions are necessary, it is still easy enough to
imagine an EDE burying a homeowner beneath an intimidating hill of
paperwork that many victims would likely regard as
incomprehensib Ie.
The PHF A dictates the terms of foreclosure reconveyances in
several ways. It requires that the homeowner receive at least 82% of
the net proceeds from any resale of the property that occurs within
eighteen months of the date the homeowner entered into the
reconveyance. 180 The statute also mandates that a foreclosure
purchaser (the party obtaining title from the original homeowner)
ascertain that the homeowner have the reasonable ability to reacquire
title to the property.181 Further, the PHFA defines reasonable ability
in this context by stating that if the homeowner's "primary housing
expenses," plus any other payments resulting from personal debt, do
not exceed 60% of her monthly gross income, there is a rebuttable
presumption of reasonable ability to pay. 182
These provisions are useful primarily because they present a blackletter line that would-be EDEs may not cross if they are to avoid
liability. In addition, the PHF A prohibits any foreclosure consultant
from acquiring, either "directly or indirectly, or by means of a
subsidiary, affiliate, or corporation" an interest in the property of a
homeowner with whom the consultant has entered into a foreclosure
consulting contract. 183 Thus, the PHFA draws a line between
foreclosure consultants and foreclosure purchasers. Consistent with
this, the statute prohibits foreclosure purchasers from representing to
homeowners in any way that they are helping to save the house or
otherwise acting in an advisory capacity. 184
While the PHF A makes it nearly impossible for an EDE to legally
strip equity from homeowners facing foreclosure, this is not the
statute's primary significance. Under common-law doctrines such as
fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, and unconscionabili~, some EDEs'
practices were illegal before the PHF A's enactment. I 5 Keeping that
179.
180.

181.
182.
183.
184.
185.

Jd. §§ 7-306(a)(5), 7-306(c)(2), 7-3 IO(c).
ld. § 7-31l(b)(2)(ii).
Jd. § 7-311(b)(l)(i).
ld. § 7-31 I (c)(l).
ld. § 7-307(5).
ld. §§ 7-31 I (b)(4)(i), (b)(4)(iii).
Professor Lauren E. Willis eschews traditional approaches to defining "foreclosure
rescue scams" as either complete fraud or by referencing unwieldy "lists of specific
predatory practices." Willis, supra note 57, at 735-36, 738-40. Instead, she
propounds a new definition of "predatory lending" as "noncompetitively overpriced
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in mind, the PHFA therefore makes it much easier to prove that
FRF-injust about any conceivable form-is, in fact, illegal. 186
Perhaps more importantly, the PHFA effectively increases the
availability of legal representation to victims of FRF. 187 The impact
is rooted in the language of section 7-320(c), which provides that, in
civil actions against parties subject to the PHFA's authority, the court
may award "damages equal to three times the amount of actual
damages" if it finds that "the defendant willfully or knowingly"
violated the statute. 188 The PHF A also includes misdemeanor
criminal penalties for guilty EDEs; 189 however, in Part V, this
Comment will address the need for harsher penalties in order to
further deter EDEs from engaging in predatory lending practices. 190
Finally, the PHF A contains a provision stating that a "bona fide
purchaser ... or lender for value who enters into a transaction with a
homeowner or a foreclosure purchaser when a foreclosure consulting
contract is in effect or during the period when a foreclosure
reconveyance may be rescinded... receives good title to the
property." 191 This good title is free and clear of any interest that any
party to the reconveyance or foreclosure consulting contract,
including the homeowner, may have had. 192 This language opens a

186.

187.
188.

189.
190.
191.
192.

and overly risky home loans." Id. at 735-36, 740. While Maryland's General
Assembly has attempted to curb certain practices that are subsumed under Willis'
concept of "predatory lending" by enacting the PHF A, other jurisdictions have
strived to extend homeowners similar protections by employing common law
doctrines of fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, and unconscionability. See, e.g., Barker
v. Altegra Credit Co., 251 B.R. 250, 257-60 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2000) (holding that a
mortgage broker committed fraud and breached her fiduciary duty to use her best
efforts to find a loan in the best interests of the borrower).
The language of the PHFA provides bright-line, substantive protections for
homeowners. For example, under the PHFA, a contract must be given to the
homeowner that specifies the terms of the foreclosure consulting agreement, must
give notice of rescission rights and must include warnings that the homeowner should
confer with an attorney before signing. REAL PROP. § 7-306.
See id. § 7-320.
Id. § 7-320(c). The possibility of being awarded damages beyond those actually
sustained, in the form of punitive damages, encouragcs citizcns to serve as
prosecutors and thereby act as "private attorneys general." David Owcn, Punitive
Damages in Products Liability Litigation, 74 MICH. L. REv. 1257, 1287-88 (1976).
The same concept can be applied to claims for treble damages as such claims permit
the litigation of claims that might otherwise be too expensive for an individual
plaintiff to initiate. Richard C. Ausness, Retribution and Deterrence: The Role of
Punitive Damages in Products Liability Litigation, 74 Ky. L.J. 1,69 (1986).
REAL PROP. § 7-321.
See infra notes 273-85 and accompanying text.
REAL PROP. § 7-311(e).
Id.
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potentially exploitable loophole in the PHF A. While the provision
does not enable EDEs to strip equity without breaking the law, it
nevertheless comes dangerously close to enabling lenders to do
business with EDEs and their affiliates and claim BFP <Rrotection,
since these lenders typically are not parties to FRF scams. 1
If such a lender were afforded BFP protection, then even a
homeowner who successfully obtains judgment against an EDE could
lose her home, since the lender would retain title to it. 194 The
PHFA's BFP loophole has enabled the more clever EDEs to profit by
taking out new mortgage loans secured by properties to which they
have fraudulently acquired title. 195 As long as lenders have a good
chance of benefiting from BFP protections, even respectable,
mainstream lenders have little economic incentive to closely examine
just how a borrower has gained title to the secured property. 196
The question of whether Maryland's courts will judge institutions
that lend, unwittingly or otherwise, to EDEs and their affiliates to be
BFPs therefore looms large for attorneys who represent FRF victims.
The following section addresses this issue.
IV. LITIGATING FROM THE PLAINTIFF'S SIDE
A.

BFP Law and Inquiry Notice

Presumably, one of the goals of an attorney representing the victim
of an FRF scheme will be to enable the client to keep his or her
home. As previously noted, language in the PHFA purporting to
protect "bona fide purchaser!s]. ... or... lender[s] for value"
presents a potential obstacle. 1 7 If Maryland's courts ultimately
decide that a party who has made a mortgage loan to an EDE's third
party, based on the equity in that home, is a BFP lender, title to the

193.

194.
195.

196.
197.

See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, CONSUMER PROTECTION: FEDERAL & STATE
AGENCIES FACE CHALLENGES IN COMBATING PREDATORY LENDING, GAO-04-280, at
6, 72-73, 76 (2004) [hereinafter CONSUMER PROTECTION] (While the secondary
market for mortgage loans may benefit borrowers by increasing access to credit, it
may also facilitate predatory lending by both "providing a source of funds for
unscrupulous originators to quickly sell off loans with predatory terms" and
"reducing incentives for these originators to ensure that borrowers can repay their
loans.").
REAL PROP. § 7-311(e). See infra notes 201-10 and accompanying text for a
discussion of the liability of a lender claiming BFP protection.
CONSUMER PROTECTION, supra note 193, at 72, 76.
/d. at 76-77.
REAL PROP. § 7-311(e).
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home ultimately passes to the lender. 198 In such a case, the mortgage
owed to this lender by either the EDE or the EDE's third party agent
(in whose name the loan would likely be) would have to be paid off
before the victimized homeowner could recover good title to the
home. 199
While, in theory, a court may hold an EDE liable for any money
owed to a BFP lender, it seems unlikely that a plaintiffs attorney, not
to mention his or her client, would want the restoration of title in the
home to depend upon the solvency of a scam artist. Similarly, if a
party who entered into a contract to buy the property from the EDE,
or a third party agent thereof, were judged by the courts to be a BFP
purchaser, the victim might come away from litigation with plenty of
cash but no title to her home. 2oo Clearly, under the PHFA's existing
language, it will be in a plaintiffs interest to argue that any non-EDE
affiliated party claiming title to or a security interest in her home is
not a BFP.
A purchaser of real property is considered a BFP if he enters into
the conveyance without notice of any existinJ.1 claims to the property
to which such claims could cloud his title. 2 A purchaser may be
charged with actual or constructive notice of extant or competing
claims to his title. 202 In the case of the former, the vendee has been
expressly informed of any potentially problematic claims,
encumbrances, or interests. 203 Constructive notice generally takes
two different forms. Buyers of real property are responsible for
knowledge of any interests that have been properly recorded in the
applicable jurisdiction's land records. 204 This legal mandate is known
as record notice. 205
In addition, the law presumes that a vendee of real property has
made a proper examination of any circumstances that would alert a
person of average vigilance to the possibility of existing umesolved
claims to the property.206 Along with this, the purchaser is also
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.

Id.
See supra notes 40-137 and accompanying text for an account of how EDEs use
third parties to secure mortgage financing for their own gain.
See REAL PROP. § 7-311(e). For a description of the PHFA's trcble damages
provision see supra notes 187-88, and accompanying text.
Frederick Ward Assocs. v. Venture, Inc., 99 Md. App. 251, 256, 636 A.2d 496, 498
(1994).
Greenpoint Mortgage Funding, Inc. v. Schlossberg, 390 Md. 211, 247, 888 A.2d 297,
319 (2005).
Grayson v. Buffington, 233 Md. 340, 343--44,196 A.2d 893, 895-96 (1964).
Greenpoint Mortgage, 390 Md. at 229, 231, 888 A.2d at 308, 310.
!d. at 230, 888 A.2d at 308.
Blondell v. Turover, 195 Md. 251,257,72 A.2d 697,699 (1950).
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charged with knowledge of any facts that such an investigation would
have revealed. 207
This second form of constructive notice is referred to as inquiry
notice. 208 It is this form of notice that is likely to be of primary
interest to an attorney representing the victim of an FRF scheme, as
an EDE is certainly not going to inform a lender or buyer that his title
to the property at issue was fraudulently obtained. 209 Thus, a lender
or purchaser seeking BFP protection is not liable to be charged with
actual notice of the victim's claim to the property.210 On the other
hand, a title search of the home will reveal both the original mortgage
loan and the foreclosure filing that wompted the victim to enter into a
privity relationship with the EDE.2 1
A party who actually seeks to buy the victim's home from the EDE
or an agent thereof will have record notice that the property was
recently in foreclosure and that the property remains subject to the
original mortgage (the one in the victim homeowner's name).212 If
the prospective buyer nonetheless goes ahead with the transaction
and "buys" the property from the EDE, it seems likely that the buyer
would thus be charged with record notice of, at least, the existing
mortgage. 213 While an EDE might be able to fool certain people into
thinking that this existing mortgage is somehow no longer a problem,
this is not the sort of transaction that presents the biggest threat to the
distressed homeowner's hope of quieting title via litigation. 214
Rather, as we saw earlier, EDEs are using the existing equity on the
homes to which they have fraudulently obtained title as a means of
obtaining additional mortgage funding-which they then pocketknowing that someone else's name (typically the third party's) is on
the paperwork. 215 Although the parties making these loans will be
charged with the same record notice attributed to a would-be
purchaser of the property, in the case of a lender this would be beside
the point.
A prudent financial institution will likely only loan a purported
title-holder, be it an EDE or anyone else, an amount of money that is

207.
208.
209.
210.

[d.
[d.
[d.
See supra notes 191-96 and accompanying text.

21l.
212.
213.

J. PAUL RIEGER, JR., EXAMINING TITLES TO REAL ESTATE IN MARYLAND 5 (1997).
See GORDON, supra note 50, at 330-31.
Kramer v. Emche, 64 Md. App. 27,43-44,494 A.2d 225, 234 (1985).
See Morin Interview, supra note 13; see also Robinson Interview, supra note 97.
See supra notes 104-13 and accompanying text.

214.
215.
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216
reasonably secured by the property backing the loan.
The lender
will ascertain the existing liability on the original mortgage in the
distressed homeowner's name before extending any credit to the
EDE.217 When the EDE takes the money and runs off to Tahiti, the
institution that has lent the EDE this money will presumably
foreclose on the property.218 The value of the home will, if the
second lender correctly ascertained the existing equity upon
extending credit, cover the amounts owed to both the original creditor
(who loaned money to the victim homeowner) and the second lender
(who disbursed funds to the EDE or an agent).219 The presence of
the original mortgage, therefore, would lack the decisive significance
for the second lender that it would have for an actual purchaser. 220
The second lender (lending to the EDE's third party agent) would not
ultimately be harmed, at least in theory, even if the holder of the first
mortgage was given priority; the eventual sale of the property would
make both parties whole. 221
B.

Maryland BFP Precedent

A quick recap of the significance of the PHFA's BFP provision
might be helpful at this point. Because the more sophisticated EDEs
are choosing to profit from their victims' equity by taking out
mortgage loans based upon this equity, the institutions making these
loans may well be judged by the courts to be BFP lenders. 222 If they
in fact are so judged, their claim to the victim's property could
prevent successful plaintiffs from regaining clear title to their
homes. 223 Plaintiffs' attorneys, therefore, will want to argue that
these lenders are not BFPs. The most plausible theory upon which
such an argument can be built is that the circumstances incident to the
extension of credit by the lender at issue to the EDE (or her agent)
should have put the lender on in~uiry notice as to a possible defect in
the EDE's title to the property.22

216.
217.
218.

219.
220.
221.
222.
223.

224.

See generally Willis, supra note 57, at 723.
Dale A. Whitman, Mortgage Drafting: Lessons from the Restatement

0/ Mortgages,

33 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 415,447 (1998).
GORDON, supra note 50, at 48.
See David B. Simpson, Real Property Foreclosures: The Fallacy o/Durrett, 19 REAL
PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 73,79-80 (1984).

See id.
See id.
See supra notes 191-96 and accompanying text.
MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 7-311(a) (LexisNexis Supp. 2006).
See, e.g., Blondell v. Turover, 195 Md. 251, 72 A.2d 697 (1950).
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In the 1950 case Blondell v. Turover,225 the Court of Appeals of
Maryland established the standard for inquiry notice that remains the
rule today. The court stated:
In determining whether a purchaser had notice of any prior
equities or unrecorded interests, so as to preclude him from
being entitled to protection as a bona fide purchaser, the rule
is that if he had knowledge of circumstances which ought to
have put a person of ordinary prudence on inquiry, he will
be presumed to have made such inquiry and will be charged
with notice of all facts which such an investigation would in
all probability have disclosed if it had been properly
pursued. 226
Blondell involved a situation in which a real estate broker sought to
purchase a tract ofland before another party's option to buy the same
The broker, in effect, willfully ignored
land had expired. 227
indications of the option holder's existing rights to the prope!1Y and
entered into a contract with the vendor to acquire the land. 228 The
Court of Appeals of Maryland, applying the inquiry notice rule cited
above, held that the real estate broker was not a BFP. 229 The court
reasoned that had the broker, in response to indications that another
party retained an option to purchase the property in question,
undertaken a reasonably diligent inquiry to determine whether this
was in fact the case, the broker would have learned that it indeed was
true. 230 The broker was thus char~ed with this knowledge and hence
not entitled to protection as a BFP. 31
Blondell has been followed by Maryland courts several times since
its issuance, most notably, for our purposes, in the 1985 case Kramer
v. Emche. 232 In Kramer, a lender, in the course of examining title to
a residential property to which it had gained two deeds of trust as
security for a pair of loans, discovered that the deed to the property
was not in the borrower's name. 233 The lender then confronted the
borrower with this information. 234 The borrower explained to the
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.

Id.
!d. at 257, 72 A.2d at 699.
!d. at 254-56, 72 A.2d at 698-99.
Id. at 256, 72 A.2d at 699.
!d. at 257-58, 72 A.2d at 699-700.
!d. at 258, 72 A.2d at 700.
!d.
64 Md. App. 27,494 A.2d 225 (1985).
Id. at 33, 494 A.2d at 229.
!d. at 33-34, 494 A.2d at 229.
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lender that upon acquiring the property, he (the borrower) had lacked
the funds to pay the applicable taxes, which, in tum, prevented him
from being able to secure a deed in his name. 235 AcceRting this
explanation, the lender thereupon paid the aforesaid taxes. 36 After
doing this, the lender went forward with the two loans to the
borrower, who in tum recorded a deed to the property in his name. 237
The excuse given to the lender by the borrower for initially lacking
record title in his name was, as it turns out, the truth. 238 It was not,
however, the whole truth. 239 Unbeknownst to the lending party, the
borrower still owed the bulk of the purchase price for the home to the
initial vendor. 240 In addition, this debt was, as one would expect,
secured by a deed of truSt. 241 Why did the lender here go forward
with the transaction knowing that, in fact, there was virtually no
equity in the home to protect its interests in the event of default? It
did so because it did not, in fact, know this. The lender failed to
perform a title search of the securing pro~erty which would have
revealed any outstanding mortgages or liens. 42
Owing to an attorney's negligence, the mortgage backing the
outstandin~ debt for the purchase price of the home had never been
recorded. 2 The lending party, therefore, had not been placed on
record notice that any such debt existed. 244 When the borrower
ultimately defaulted on all three loans (the one owed to the vendor
and the two owed to the subsequent lender), foreclosure proceedings
followed. 245 At issue in the resulting litigation, of course, was which
creditor's mortgage would take priority.246 The Court of Special
Appeals of Maryland ruled that, the aforementioned gap in the land
records notwithstanding, the overall circumstances of the transaction
between the lending and borrowing parties here had ~ut the lender on
inquiry notice of the already existing mortgage. 24 As such, the
lender was not entitled to BFP protection, and its claim to the home

235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.

!d. at 34, 494 A.2d at 229.
!d.
!d.
fd. at 31-44, 494 A.2d at 228-34.
fd. at 34, 494 A.2d at 229.
/d. at 42, 494 A.2d at 231.
fd. at 32, 494 A.2d at 228.
fd. at 33-34, 494 A.2d at 229.
/d. at 32, 494 A.2d at 228.
!d.
!d. at 35, 494 A.2d at 230.
fd. at 36, 494 A.2d at 230.
fd. at 44, 494 A.2d at 234.
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was subordinated to that of holder of the original mortgage (the one
backing the purchase price of the home). 248
In some respects, the Kramer precedent bodes well for attorneys
who are, or will soon be, arguing that an institution lending to an
EDE should, by virtue of the "totality of the circumstances"
surrounding the transaction, be charged with inquiry notice of the
fraud underlying the ~rocess by which the EDE has obtained title to
the securing property. 49 In Kramer, the court in effect reasoned that
a borrower who had not been able to pay the taxes on property he had
purchased should not simply be assumed to have already paid for this
property in full. 25o The simple lack of a recorded mortgage,
therefore, should not have put the lender at ease. Rather, the odd and
unlikely juxtaposition of unpaid taxes and the complete lack of any
recorded lien should, as the line of reasoning concludes, have aroused
the lender's suspicions and led to further inquiry. In tum, such
further in~uiry would have revealed the existence of the unrecorded
mortgage. 51
Kramer is on point for our purposes in that it deals with lenders,
rather than purchasers, seeking and being denied BFP protection. At
the same time, however, there is plenty to distinguish the facts of
Kramer from those of a case involving possible BFP status for an
EDE's creditor. Any halfway-competent EDE will have ensured that
title to the victim's home is in his agent third partY's name before
seeking out financing based on the home's equity.252 An attorney for
a lender seeking clear title to the victim's property on the grounds of
BFP status would certainly stress this in seeking to distinguish
Kramer. On the other hand, a plaintiff s attorney seeking to save the
victim's claim to her home, might point out that the inevitable
presence of a recent foreclosure filing in an FRF scenario presents a
compelling reason why any subsequent lender should be charged
with inquiry notice. 253
C.

First Impression

While Kramer merits the treatment it has received here because it
appears to be the only Maryland inquiry notice case involving a
lender for value, the truth is that the question of whether a party who
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.

[d. at 43, 494 A.2d at 234.
Id. at 44, 494 A.2d at 234.
See id. at 34, 43, 494 A.2d at 229, 234.
[d. at 44, 494 A.2d at 234.
TRIPOLI & RENUART, supra note 4, at 8, 33.
GORDON, supra note 50, at 330-31.
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lends to an EDE' s third party agent merits BFP status will be one of
first impression in Maryland. 254 The confluence of evolving methods
of FRF, the newness of the PHFA, the potential loophole created by
the PHF A's BFP language, and the likelihood of increased FRF
litigation born of the opportunity for treble damages has placed the
BFP doctrine on a collision course with an almost inevitable
challenge to its scope. 255
A lack of precedent does not, by itself, leave us without clues as to
how the issue will play out when it eventually reaches Maryland's
appellate courts. Certain basic factors are likely to shape the
arguments presented by both sides. Any party that has lent to an
EDE and subsequently seeks BFP protection will have had record
notice of both the existence of an outstanding mortgage in another
person's name and a recent foreclosure filing on the property in
question. 256 An attorney seeking to quiet title in an FRF victim's
name could argue that these facts should have aroused the suspicions
of any reasonably prudent lender. From this, a plaintiffs advocate
could reason that a properly diligent investigation conducted by the
lender to discover the reasons for both the outstanding mortgage and
the recent foreclosure filing would have revealed that the EDE
acquired title through fraudulent means. 257 In effect, a lawyer on this
side of the issue would contend that the lender ought not be rewarded
with BFP protection for turning a blind eye to a facially dubious set
of circumstances.
While this reasoning might prevail when all is said and done on this
issue, we cannot be certain of it. Confession and avoidance may well
be a viable strategls for a lender facing an inquiry-notice-based
challenge to its title. 58 A bona fide lender for value can argue that so
long as it has ascertained that the party to whom it has lent money
254.
255.

256.
257.
258.

See Baltrotsky v. Kugler, 395 Md. 468, 474-75,910 A.2d 1089, 1093-94 (2006); see
also Pizza v. Walter, 345 Md. 664, 674-75, 694 A.2d 93,98 (1996).
According to Morin and Robinson, the question of whether lenders to EDEs merit
BFP status will likely reach Maryland's appellate courts in the next two to three
years. Morin Interview, supra note 13; Robinson Interview, supra note 97. If the
changes to the PHF A recommended in Part V of this comment were to be adopted,
however, BFP doctrine could be preserved as it is-with no need for judicial
intervention.
See supra notes 212-16 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 102-13 and accompanying text.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 11, at 317. Confession and avoidance is a
form of pleading in which a defendant files an answer admitting the plaintiffs factual
allegations but arguing that these facts, when combined with additional facts adduced
by the defendant, are insufficient to prove that the plaintiff has a valid legal claim
against the defendant. See generally 61 A AM. JUR. 20 PLEADING § 296 (1999).
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does in fact hold title to the home in question, it has fulfilled its
obligation to properly safeguard its own interests. 259 Once again, the
strong likelihood that any institution lending (albeit, unwittingly) to
an EDE or affiliate thereof will only lend within existing equity
looms large. It enables a lender for value to plausibly argue that the
existence of an outstanding mortgage on the securing property need
not elicit any further inquiry on its part because it does not pose any
threat to its interests. If there is sufficient equity to cover the loans
extellded by both the first mortgagee and the subsequent one (the one
unknowingly lending to the EDE), then the latter lender can in fact
contend that once it ascertains through a record search that the party
to whom it has lent funds does possess title to the securing property,
its inquiry duties have been fulfilled. 260
The foregoing argument is not, at first glance, ethically edifying.
In effect, the lender would be arguing that facial suspiciousness aside,
so long as it has effectively looked after its own interests, it has done
what it must in order to earn protection as a BFP. In fact, the
traditional void title versus voidable title 261 distinction provides some
support for this position. When title to real property has been
fraudulently acquired in a manner that the victim could have
prevented, the swindler gets "voidable title" which is ratified or
"annulled" once it passes for value to a party without knowledge of
the fraud. 262 The party without knowledge is then protected as a BFP
because whereas the initial victim did have some power to prevent
the fraud, the BFP may have had only limited ability to even discover
the fraud. 263
A victim homeowner's attorney seeking to quiet title could aver
that notice of an outstanding mortgage gives a subsequent lender
constructive notice of an at best questionable transfer of ownership
from the victim to the EDE. The lender's advocate could counter this
by pointing out that the victim homeowner nonetheless had the ability
259.
260.
261.

262.
263.

GORDON, supra note 50, at 1126.
MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 7-311(e) (LexisNexis Supp. 2006).
"Void title" carries with it neither remedy nor a duty to perform, as the transaction in
question is not legally binding from the start. Examples of transactions that are void
include ones that contradict statute, violate public policy, run afoul of laws, or
contain uncertain or indefinite terms. A "voidable title" is one where a party has the
power to avoid the legal relations created by a contract. Specific reasons to avoid a
contract include infancy, fraud, mistake, duress, and some kinds of illegality. I
SAMUEL WILLISTON, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § I :20 (Richard A. Lord ed.,
Thomson West 4th ed. 2007).
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note II, at 1605.
See Fertitta v. Bay Shore Dev. Corp., 252 Md. 393, 404, 250 A.2d 69,76 (1969).
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to prevent the fraud and failed to do so and must, therefore, bear the
burden traditionally assigned by voidable title doctrine. Further, the
lender could reason that the only thing a still-outstanding mortgage
really demonstrates is that the original homeowner failed to convey
title on favorable terms. Surely, the lender could conclude, it is not
the lender's job to ensure a good deal for some homeowner with
whom it has no privity relationship.
The legal battle will be intricate, interesting, and quite uncertain in
its outcome until Maryland's highest appellate court issues a
precedent-making decision. Part V.C of this Comment, however, will
suggests a change to the PHFA that would, if adopted, render the
foregoing discussion moot in a manner favorable to victimized
homeowners seeking clear title to their homes.
V. RECOMMENDATIONS
A.

Exemptions in the PHFA

The PHF A does not explicitly define the term affiliate; thus the
reach of its exemptions of several different classes of professionals
opens the door to possible abuse. 264 This opening may be somewhat
narrow, but it is an opening nonetheless.
For example, let us say that a real estate broker, operating as an
EDE, facilitates the transfer of title to a number of properties in
foreclosure to several different parties. Most or all of these parties
eventually sell the properties they have acquired at a handsome
profit. In doing so, they employ the real estate broker in question and
pay him generous commissions. Are these third party purchasers
affiliates of the broker? Should the EDE be estopped from claiming
that they are not affiliates? To answer the latter question, we would
presumably have to examine the terms of the contracts by which title
was transferred, as well as any opportunities the distressed
homeowners had to reacquire title under these contracts. We would
also need to look at the totality of the dealings between the broker
and the third parties. At the same time, however, it would seem that
if the terms under which the third parties gained title to the properties
in foreclosure were substantively unconscionable, this would strongly
suggest that these third parties should at least be considered affiliates
of the broker; if they were not, the PHFA would not apply.
The above scenario suggests that there might be an area of legal
wiggle in which exempted parties may profit from dealings with

264.

MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. §§ 7-301, 7-302(a)(3)(ii) (LexisNexis Supp. 2006); see
also supra note 156 and accompanying text.
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homeowners in foreclosure, so long as any terms they convince the
distressed homeowners to accept do not meet the standard of
substantive unconscionability. One could argue that this is not, in
itself, a bad thing. The PHF A's very lack of specificity in defining
"affiliate" might be seen as opening a potentially salubrious space of
contractual freedom within which experienced professionals, like real
estate brokers and attorneys, can work with homeowners in
foreclosure towards potential solutions that are mutually beneficial,
including ones involving transfer of title. If any such professionals
step over the line of propriety, the argument might conclude; then,
common law remedies such as fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, and
unconscionability would provide legal recourse to any injured parties.
Any merits of conceptual or ideological elegance that such an
argument might present are more than offset by the actual
circumstances in re~onse to which the PHF A was drafted and
ultimately enacted. 26 The proliferation of FRF, both in Maryland
and across the United States, should serve as compelling evidence
that when interested parties approach homeowners in foreclosure
purporting to offer assistance, the likelihood of these homeowners
losing not only their homes but also most or all of the equity they
have earned over time is far too high. 266 The number of victims that
have fallen prey to EDEs across the country is far too high to accord
with the implicit standards of equity of any society that subscribes to
the rule of law. 267 Freedom of contract in cases involving distressed
homeowners has, in practice, amounted to the freedom to profit
inequitably at their expense. Given the disparities between many of
these homeowners and the EDEs in terms of financial and legal
literacy, psychological circumstances, and resources, any other
outcome would be surprisin~. Law exists to ensure equity where its
absence might threaten it. 2
It does not exist for the pu~ose of
giving aid to those who would abuse the freedoms it secures. 69 The
265.

266.
267.
268.
269.

Alexander Gordon, IV, who helped draft the PHFA, expressed to present writer that
the primary reason the aforementioned exemptions are in the statute in the first place
is the pressure applied by interested industry lobbyists. While present writer does not
know exactly which arguments they presented, it seems reasonable to suppose that
the free market "opposing argument" presented above would be agreeable to them.
See Gordon Interview, supra note 14l.
See TRIPOLI & RENUAL T, supra note 4, at 17, 51.
"Equity" is defined as "[t]he body of principles constituting what is fair and right;
natural law." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 11, at 579.
See FREDERIC BASTIAT, THE LAW 7 (Dean Russell trans., The Found. for Econ.
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See id. at 12.
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PHFA's language limiting the exemptions it contains should,
therefore, be strengthened.
The only reason present writer recommends that this language be
augmented, rather than recommending that the exemptions be
eliminated altogether, is the belief that the latter option might not be
politically viable. 27o If legislative will could, in fact, be mustered to
eliminate these exemptions, this would be the better alternative.
Apart from making inchoate intellectual grunts about the sanctity of
freedom of contract, those who would argue to maintain exemptions
are charged with the task of demonstrating that, if engaged in by
someone in an exempted group, the actions proscribed by the PHFA
are more likely to be beneficial to a distressed homeowner than they
are to be harmful. Otherwise, why exempt anyone from the PHFA's
authority?
Such a contention would be a non-starter. It could be viewed that
certain prohibited practices, such as accepting compensation for
foreclosure consulting services before their performance has been
completed, are not facially fraudulent. 271 Perhaps the exemption
could be limited such that it applies only to these particular practices;
potentially, this limitation could greatly reduce the chances of a
vulnerable homeowner's being treated inequitably as a result of the
statute's exceptions.
If, however, the exemptions remain, the language limiting those
exemptions should be strengthened. One way to do this would be to
replace the current clause with one providing that any services that
fall under the statute's definition of foreclosure consulting service. 272
Any exempted party would then lose its status if it violated the rules
binding non-profit organizations that deal solely with homeowners in
foreclosure or loan default. In effect, such a clause would require
those in exempted classes who purport to assist homeowners facing
foreclosure to operate as non-profit entities when proffering and
rendering this assistance.
B.

Felony Status

Under Maryland law, a person who is convicted of theft of property
or services valued at $500 or more is guilty of a felony.273 As we
have seen, the PHFA provides that any person convicted of violating
any of the statute's provisions is guilty of a misdemeanor and is

270.
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See, e.g., Ragsdale v. Wolverine World Wide, Inc., 535 U.S. 81,93-94 (2002).
See MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 7-307(1) (LexisNexis Supp. 2006).
ld. § 7-301(a).
MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 7-104(g)(l) (LexisNexis 2002 & Supp. 2006).
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subject to a prison sentence of no longer than three years. 274 As of
this writing, it is not entirely clear how the PHF A's criminal penalties
provision would be applied in the case of an EDE accused of
violating multiple clauses. Consider a scenario in which the state
prosecutes an EDE for: (1) failing to adequately verify that a
homeowner agreeing to a reconveyance possessed the means to meet
its terms; (2) presenting to the homeowner a contract printed in 10point rather than 12-point type; (3) neglecting to provide a notice of
rescission with the contract; (4) engaging in conduct intended to
mislead the victim homeowner; and (5) retaining more than 18% of
the proceeds from a subsequent sale of the victim's home that
occurred within 18 months of the date on which she entered into the
reconveyance agreement.
Under such a scenario, would the EDE, upon conviction of all five
violations, face a possible three-year sentence for each? Fifteen years
in prison for someone who has willfully committed FRF seems
facially just, but misdemeanor penalties, b~ and large, do not lend
themselves to such lengthy incarcerations. 2 5 If, on the other hand,
violations of the PHF A were prosecuted on a single-count basis with
one three-year sentence for a person found guilty of violating
multiple provisions, an EDE guilty of robbing a vulnerable
homeowner of, say, $100,000 in hard earned equity could
conceivably come away with a misdemeanor conviction and a
particularly short prison sentence.
The solution to this potential shortcoming of the PHF A is not
simply to substitute the term felony for misdemeanor in the PHFA's
criminal penalty provision. If violating any clause of the PHF A were
a felony, any number of possibly innocent mistakes could then result
in non-EDEs being branded as felons. 276 We do not want strict
felony liability for someone who, in the course of a sincere attempt to
help a distressed homeowner, accidentally uses ll-point type or
forgets to provide a notice of rescission. At the same time, given
how potentially destructive FRF can be to its victims, it does not
appear that softening the PHFA's penalty section to remove the
implication of strict liability would be a good idea. An EDE savvy
enough to ply his pernicious trade could conceivably trick a jury into
believing he did not really "intend" to violate the PHF A. As it is
274.
275.

276.

REAL PROP. § 7-321(a).
A misdemeanor is a crime characterized by a penalty of a short term of confinement
"in a place other than prison (such as a county jail)." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY,
supra note II, at 1020.
REAL PROP. § 7-321(a).
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already included in the PHFA, 277 the strict liability provision should
therefore remain therein.
Present writer's recommended solution is to incorporate
Maryland's theft statute 278 into the PHFA by reference. This could
be done in terms of particular clauses that are already in the theft
statute. For example, section 7-104 of the Criminal Article of the
Maryland Code specifies unauthorized control over property by
means of deception as one form of theft. 279 The definition includes:
(1) obtaining control over the property of another by means of
deception with the intent to deprive the owner ofthe property; and (2)
using the property of another with the knowled~e that such use will
"probably" deprive the owner of the property. 2 These are not the
only acts included in the aforesaid definition, but for our purposes
they are the most germane.
As it is currently written, Maryland's theft statute arguably could
be used to prosecute perpetrators of FRF at the felony level. Any title
to the property that an EDE might have obtained has, as we have
seen, almost certainly been gained by deceptive means. 281 It is,
therefore, of little or no defense to theft for an EDE to claim that he
cannot be accused of stealing what is, by contract, no longer owned
by the victim homeowner. The use of a third party is also not a
strong shield for an EDE. Even if a scam artist convinces someone to
obtain title to the property at issue and then takes out a new mortgage
on the remaining equity, the EDE remains a primary actor in the
scheme. 282
Under this scenario, the EDE has: (1) used deception in order to
gain effective control over the victim's property because the third
party is merely acting as the EDE's agent; and (2) used the property
. in a way that is almost certain to deprive the distressed homeowner of
it. In taking out a new loan secured by the house in question for the
sole purpose of making off with the proceeds from that loan, the EDE
has made use of that house for his own purposes. Further, this use is
almost certain to eventually deprive the victim of her home because
the EDE has no intention of ever paiEing off the loan. Why should he,
since it is in the third party's name? 83
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See id.
CRIM. LAW § 7-104.
[d. § 7-104(b).
See id. § 7-104(c)(l)(iii).
See supra notes 37-137 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 104-13 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 40-133 and accompanying text.
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Based on the foregoing, it is no stretch to suggest that the following
language could be inserted into the PHF A's criminal penalty section:
Any continuing course of conduct intended to deprive a
homeowner in foreclosure, or one who has been in
foreclosure at any point within six months prior to entering
into a foreclosure consulting and/or reconveyance
agreement, of any amount of the value of that person's
home, will be considered "Unauthorized control over
property--By Deception," pursuant to Maryland Criminal
Code section 7_104. 284
Such language would, in effect, treat any instance of FRF that
accrues to the direct or indirect financial benefit of an EDE, or
conversely, the financial detriment of the victim, as an act of theft.
As such, if the amount of the deprivation reaches $500 or greater, it
will be considered a felony.285
There is no need for the existing language in the PHF A providing
for misdemeanor penalties to be stricken. Rather, the language can
be applied to violations of the PHFA that do not redound to the
monetary detriment of the homeowner in question. A foreclosure
consultant who fails, for example, to include a notice of rescission in
a proffered contract, but does not otherwise harm the homeowner
with whom he is dealing, ought not be branded a felon. Of course,
any violation of the PHF A that is, by itself, a misdemeanor may ripen
into a felony under the framework recommended herein.
If, say, a foreclosure consultantlEDE were to innocently forget to
include a notice of rescission in a reconveyance agreement presented
to and signed by a homeowner facing foreclosure, this would,
standing alone, constitute a misdemeanor.
If, however, the
homeowner later learns of his rescission rights under the PHFA and
demands that the conveyance to the EDE or agent thereof be voided,
only to be rebuffed by the EDE, a potential felony develops. If the
EDE's conduct under this set of facts eventually causes the
homeowner to lose $500 or more of the value of his home, then the
initial misdemeanor has, in fact, mutated into a felony. Such a
manner of criminal classification would be wholly consistent with
extant language in Maryland's theft statute providing that in
determining the monetary degree of the victim's deprivation, any
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MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 7-104(b) (LexisNexis 2002 & Supp. 2006).
See id. § 7-1 04(g)(l).
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separate losses resulting from "one scheme" or "continuing course of
conduct" will be "aggregated.,,286
The revisions recommended in this subsection are intended to
provide investigators and prosecutors who deal with FRF added
enforcement potency and a measure of flexibility. Someone who rips
off a desperate person for tens of thousands of dollars clearly merits
the legal condemnation only felony sanctions can provide. At the
same time, for reasons already discussed, not every violation of the
PHFA needs to carry this degree of sanction.
C.

Voiding What Is Now Merely Voidable

Strong enforcement of the PHFA will go only so far in preventing
FRF from occurring. The likelihood that a significant number of
victims will not seek legal recourse will continue to attract certain
people to the ranks of the EDEs. Ending FRF in Maryland once and
for all will require that we make it unprofitable. A powerful and
simple change to the PHFA's BFP provision could achieve this.
Instead of explicitly holding out the possibility that a buyer of, or
lender on, an EDE-acquired property may be a BFP, the statute could
state in clear and unambiguous terms that any foreclosure consulting
contract or reconveyance agreement that in any way fails to conform
to the PHF A breaks the chain of title to the property. In addition, the
PHFA could include a provision that any violation of an otherwise
valid foreclosure consulting contract or reconveyance agreement also
breaks the chain of title.
In other words, present writer recommends that any violation of the
PHFA renders title to property conveyed pursuant to any activity
covered by the statute void, rather than voidable. The last sentence of
the preceding paragraph means exactly what it says. Any violation of
the PHFA, even one that occurs after a financial institution has
already lent money to an EDE or affiliate thereof, will break the
chain of title. The title search that the bank or other lender undertook
prior to the violation of the PHFA would thus be rendered useless.
As counterintuitive as this might appear, it is necessary.
Violations of the PHFA are likely to occur after-rather than
before-the EDE has already secured loan proceeds on the existing
If, for example, an EDE persuades a victimized
equity. 287
homeowner to agree to a foreclosure reconveyance agreement and
then takes out a loan secured by the property, the lender could argue
that the EDE had not violated the PHF A until after the loan had been
286.
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made. 288 The PHF A has only been violated, the lender could
contend, when the EDE pockets the loan proceeds and leaves the
victim to his fate. If this argument were to prevail in court, then the
lender would be able to gain clear title to the victim's property as a
BFP. This would defeat much of the purpose of the PHF A.
The only way to ensure that no party who lends to an EDE or EDEaffiliate gains BFP status, therefore, is to adopt the rule that any
violation of the PHFA, by operation of law, voids any title transferred
as part of a foreclosure consulting contract or foreclosure
reconveyance. If the state legislature were to adopt this provision as
part of the PHFA, it seems safe to say that the monetary well from
which the EDEs have begun to drink would quickly become a desert.
No lender is going to extend even a penny that is secured by a
mortgage or deed of trust that could be rendered void at any time, by
any violation of a statute that holds foreclosure "consultants" to very
exacting and particular standards. Legitimate lenders would thus be
taken out of the nefarious FRF equation altogether.
While the foregoing proposal might be controversial, it would do
far more good than harm. Even vigilant enforcement of the PHF A, as
it is now written, will not deter all who would be EDEs.289 It seems
reasonable to say that there are plenty of scam artists who to this day
remain ignorant of the PHFA and thus undeterred by it. Similarly,
while the PHF A's treble damages provision makes legal
representation much more available to victim homeowners than it
was before the PHFA's enactment,290 many victims will remain too
depressed, desperate, fatigued, and uninformed to wage a lega~ battle
against the EDEs. The best way to fight FRF is to prevent it from
happening in the first place. Denying EDEs the option of stripping
equity through mortgage loans would be a giant step in this direction.
VI. CONCLUSION
In an important way, the PHFA's principal strength is also a
potential weakness. Its comprehensiveness, particularly in defining
the extent of its scope, makes it terribly difficult for any EDE (except
those in the exempted classes) to escape its coverage. The PHFA's
substantive protections are similarly broad and thorough (except, of
course, its BFP provision). One hopes that our success in combating
FRF, or for that matter, any other significant form of fraud, is not
288.
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dependent upon our ability to heap clause upon clause and term upon
term in an unceasing effort to match the criminals as they continue to
find new paths around law and equity.
A small number of simple, yet forceful, measures of the sort
advocated in this Comment could go a long way toward stamping out
FRF in the state of Maryland. One could argue that declaring an
EDE's title void rather than voidable presents the risk of innocent
parties being harmed. In fact, innocent parties are being harmed as
you read this. The likelihood of anyone acquiring title in good faith
from an EDE after this Comment's suggestions are enacted is much,
much smaller than the chance that EDEs will continue to steal home
equity from desperate people if the PHF A is not strengthened.
One could also argue that this Comment does conceptual violence
to the "void vs. voidable" distinction. Such a charge would be
spurious. It is true the Comment advocates treating as void what is,
strictly speaking, voidable title. The definitions of void and voidable,
however, remain for the law to use as its purposes dictate. The law's
task is to employ its concepts in the manner most conducive to
fairness and equity. There is no legal or ethical justification for the
law to willfully remain straitjacketed within abstractions of its own
making.
In sum, this Comment stresses conceptually economical preventive
measures over elaborate enforcement mechanisms. Hopefully, those
who object to the suggested means on free market grounds will
recognize that the very simplicity of these means is, itself, marketfriendly. It will hopefully be fitting to end this Comment where it
began-with an allusion to freedom of contract. The best, and most
economically sensible way, to combat FRF in Maryland may well be
to alter the rules of the BFP game slightly and let the marketplace do
the rest.
Seth Yaffo

